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Abstract: 
This article examines the Reynolds Metals Company’s political networking activities in 
Washington D.C. and the state capitols of the US South in the 1940s and 1950s.  It argues 
that Reynolds’ astute recruitment of senior staff from federal and state government, adept 
building of elite networks in the legislative and executive branches, and judicious espousing 
of key political rhetoric (antitrust, regional development, national security) and nurturing of 
Democratic circles in the South, was crucial to their rise from a new entrant to US primary 
aluminum production during World War II to the second largest national producer by 1946 
and a major global player by the mid-1950s.  This same political networking was critical to 
maintaining that advantage after WWII in the face of competition from the Aluminum 
Company of America (Alcoa) and Canadian multinational the Aluminium Company of 
Canada (Alcan).  “Wartime” – covering WWII and into the Cold War – and the legacy of 
state intervention in the US from the early twentieth century until the 1960s, including the 
New Deal, provided a fertile context for this strategy.  RMC’s success owed much to 
founder Richard S. Reynolds Snr’s acumen, networks and social capital, and his experiences 
and connections accrued from working from his uncle, and noted tobacco magnate, R. J. 
Reynolds.  The article offers insights into the nature of US business-government relations. 
 
Goodwill means giving people reasons to think well of us, so that they will prefer to do 
business with us. Our Goodwill Division is the biggest thing in Reynolds Metals, and each 
of us is part of it.  Goodwill is our most precious possession… It needs constant, daily 
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entries or the ink will fade. Let’s take a good look at this thing that controls our jobs, our 
future, and our security.  Let’s look at our most precious asset.1 
In March 1949, Reynolds Metals’ vice-president Keen Johnson wrote to Company president, 
Richard S. Reynolds, Jnr., enclosing the booklet from which this extract is drawn. Johnson 
informed his boss that the rationale for This Thing Called GOODWILL “… is that we can 
improve our public relations and build up good will only by impressing upon each member of 
the Reynolds Metals organization the fact that we all have a responsibility to work daily at this 
important task”.2  Whilst the handbook was intended to instruct all employees on customer 
relations, it understated Reynolds Metals’ most significant deployment of goodwill, in their 
cultivation of political networks especially in Washington D.C.. As one of the foremost agents 
of the Company’s political activity, former Kentucky Governor Johnson was being modest 
about their achievements.3   
 
This article examines the Reynolds Metals Company’s political networking in Washington 
D.C. in the 1940s and 1950s, setting this against the context of “wartime” and the legacy of 
growing state intervention since the early twentieth century.   It examines the Company’s 
development of its public affairs capabilities through the recruitment of former federal and 
state officials, nurturing of networks in government departments and amongst legislators on 
Capitol Hill, and their deployment of their regional identity and key policy rhetoric (antitrust, 
regional development and national security) to cement relationships and gain influence and 
competitive advantage.   
 
It was RMC’s capability in building and deploying these political connections in Washington 
D.C. (as well as in the state capitols of the South), that allowed them to break into primary 
aluminum production during WWII and retain that position.  Founded in 1928 to produce 
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aluminum foil for cigarette packaging, prior to World War II, the Reynolds Metals Company 
(RMC) owned no primary aluminum production facilities and limited downstream capacity.  
By 1944 they controlled primary aluminum smelters or extrusion plants and rolling mills, as 
well as access to upstream supplies, and their share of global aluminum production reached 
7%. By 1946, they accounted for 30% of global output.4  The political goodwill they had 
accrued by the end of WWII afforded Reynolds Metals sufficient competitive advantage to 
become the second largest US primary aluminum producer and a major competitor to the 
Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), who had hitherto monopolised aluminum 
production in the US and been one of the two first movers (and dominant players) in the 
global industry.  Alcoa had enjoyed considerable political patronage from WWI, especially 
under Presidents Harding, Coolidge and Hoover.5 As testament to Alcoa’s continued market 
dominance and influence, as late as 1937 they had been able to block US Justice Department 
anti-trust investigations with support from the War Department and managed to successfully 
evade charges of acting as a trust in 1941. However, by the close of WWII, with political 
support, Reynolds (and Kaiser) had gained control of Alcoa’s Hurricane Creek and Baton 
Rouge alumina refineries, Spokane, Tacoma, and Troutdale smelters, and the Jones Mill, along 
with Alcoa’s patents.6 In such a highly integrated and capital-intensive industry, their political 
connections also allowed Reynolds Metals to secure access to upstream supplies of bauxite 
and production facilities for alumina (aluminum oxide) so that by the mid-1950s, Reynolds had 
extended their control within the global aluminium supply chain to 16.4% and 16.9% 
respectively of global bauxite and alumina output by 1955.7  
 
Reynolds’ Metals’ success was such that by December 1946, the J Walter Thompson (JWT) 
Agency, handling RMC’s public relations, reported to Richard S. Reynolds Jnr that their 
brokers Bache & Co, “are pretty high on Reynolds”.8   JWT and Bache’s confidence stemmed, 
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in large part from the political patronage that RMC were perceived to enjoy: “The 
Government’s large investment in Reynolds… may serve as a sort of reinsurance against 
unlikely attempts by others to ‘throttle’ Reynolds.”9  The value of the Company’s investment 
in its public affairs capabilities and political networks was demonstrated again in the battles of 
the late 1940s and 1950s, as Alcoa sought to reassert itself and as the Aluminium Company 
of Canada (Alcan) sought import tariffs reductions on Canadian aluminium and further US 
government contracts.  Reynolds’ ascendancy in the global industry was crowned in 1959, 
when, with the UK’s Tube Investments, it took control of another of the first movers in the 
global industry, the British Aluminium Company Ltd (BACo), who still monopolised aluminium 
smelting in the UK and the British Empire, as well as holding the exclusive British rights for 
aluminium smelting.10 Reynolds Metals rise from a modest and largely regional producer and 
supplier of aluminum foil to the tobacco industry to a dominant force in the North American, 
and global, aluminum, industry over the space of just over a decade was nothing short of 
meteoric.11 That success was built on this investment in and deployment of political 
connections.    
 
RMC’s success was initiated by their founder Richard S. Reynolds Snr., who demonstrated 
considerable prescience and political acumen in his recruitment to senior management 
positions in the Company former well-connected and highly capable public servants, such as 
Keen Johnson.  Reynolds Snr also understood from experience the importance of timing 
and of deploying key salient political themes (antitrust and regional development) and 
recognising sectional interests.  He used his family pedigree, their connections to the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Reynolds’ location as a Southern firm to their 
advantage at a time when both political houses were dominated by senior Southern 




However, this success was equally contingent upon the historical context. The success of 
Richard S Reynolds Snr’s, and RMC’s, transactions with executive and legislature (and the 
receptiveness of their approach and rhetoric) were reliant on a long tradition of southern 
Democratic patronage of business from the early twentieth century onwards, and southern 
Democrats dominance of Capitol Hill by this period. It was also directly aided by the legacy 
of state intervention under both the Hoover administration, notably the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation (RFC), and Roosevelt’s New Deal (through the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) and Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), as well as the US war 
economy.   
 
For much of this period (the 1940s and 1950s), the US legally and politically was 
overshadowed by what Mary Dudziak has referred to as “War Time”.12  “War Time” did 
not end with WWII but continued into the Cold War and peaked again during the Korean 
War, accompanied by an infrastructure for financing, producing and distributing materiel.  
Between 1931 and 1961, US government purchases of goods and services rose from 12.1% 
to 20.6% (reaching a peak in 1944 of 46.3%) and budgetary expenditure from 10.6% in 1927 
to 29.6% in 1961.13 As James Sparrow observed: “As the larger trajectory of federal 
spending, revenue, debt, employment, and military deployment in the twentieth century 
makes clear, the Second World War, building on but also superseding the New Deal was a 
critical turning point for the growth of federal government within American society.”14 The 
US, “the Arsenal of Democracy”, as FDR described it, produced two thirds of Allied 
munitions.15 Aluminum was a key strategic metal; its consumption and production grew 
dramatically during World War II and the Korean War driven by the demand for it above 
all in military aircraft manufacture. As the US Public Affairs Institute’s Dr Dewey Anderson 
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observed in 1951: “Aluminium has become the most important single bulk material of 
modern warfare.  No fighting is possible, and no war can be carried to a successful 
conclusion today, without using and destroying large quantities of aluminium.”16  As Mats 
Ingulstad has noted for aluminum, and Paul Tiffany for steel, this dramatic demand for both 
metals in wartime resulted in mounting government pressure for increased production and 
an expansion of industrial capacity to the advantage of smaller producers.17  
 
Equally crucial were the opportunities arising for RMC out of state intervention under the 
Hoover administration and Roosevelt’s New Deal, in terms of the recruitment of key 
personnel and the politics of antitrust and expansion of regional development opportunities. 
Whilst FDR’s wartime accommodation with business saw a cooling of antitrust action (as it 
had for Woodrow Wilson’s administration in WWI) and the New Deal, key members of 
the administration (notably Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes) remained ardent 
advocates and were closely tied to younger New Dealers who continued to pursue issues 
like antitrust.18 The recession of October 1937, and more specifically where monopolies 
were concerned Thurman Arnold’s tenure at the Anti Trust Division (ATD) of the 
Department of Justice (1938-43), had also reignited arguments for an interventionist role 
for the state in the economy, notably around expanding production and in efficiency gains 
for consumers, alongside productivity priorities for the war effort.  These proved 
advantageous for RMC (and were readily exploited by them).19 When former small 
businessman Harry Truman took office as President in April 1945, antitrust policy was 
renewed aided by the changes effected by Arnold at the ATD (as exemplified by the cases 




Moreover, the commitments to regional development and industrialization arising from both 
the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations continued to advantage the South and were 
further enabled by the warfare state, not least given the control of the key committees of 
both the Senate and House of Representatives by powerful southern Democrats who 
dominated Capitol Hill at this time.     Richard S. Reynolds Snr (and his successors and 
company officers) proved highly adept in their exploitation of the opportunities offered by 
that context – and their demonstration of their regional, patriotic, and antitrust credentials 
– to build organisational capabilities and sustainable competitive advantage.  That Reynolds 
Snr, and RMC, were able to do this relied on their networks and social capital in the South, 
and their prudent recruitment of the key personnel, both of which increased their legitimacy 
with pivotal political actors in Washington D.C. (and state capitols of the South).  
 
This article locates the Reynolds story’s wider relevance, then considers the role of the 
Company’s founder Richard S. Reynolds Snr, before considering their recruitment of key 
personnel pivotal to the success of their networking in Washington D.C. and the South.  It 
then outlines their coalition-building with politicians and officialdom and how these 
connections were deployed before observing the Reynolds’ families own political 
convictions and concluding. 
 
Reynolds and US business-government relations  
Beyond the intrinsic worth of the Reynolds Metals story both to US and global business 
history (especially that of the aluminum industry), it assumes a broader significance within 
debates in scholarly literature around business-government relations in the US, notably over 
development of an ‘organizational society’ in the 20th century.21 Specifically, following the 
important work of Brian Balogh and Alan Brinkley, it notes the legacy of the New Deal (as 
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well as reforms of the Hoover administration) in relation to the importance of the 
repositories of knowledge and skills within federal agencies and their transfer to the private 
sector (illustrated most prominently by figures such as David E. Lilienthal and Tommy “the 
cork” Corcoran).22 However, it also underlines the importance of a longer trajectory of 
progressive reformism. It also adds further detail to the voluminous history of the US warfare 
state of this period, as well as to that around regional industrialization.23 More broadly it 
contributes a historical case study to the social science literature around the importance of 
networks and social capital to family business survival and corporate political activity.24  
Reynolds sophisticated development of its public affairs machinery took place at a time when 
lobbyists were relatively scarce in Washington D.C. (as late as 1956, there were 615 
registered lobbyists in the DC area; by 2016, this had risen to 10,462) and before Lester 
Milbrath’s definition of lobbyists in his paradigm-shifting 1963 book.25   
 
The Reynolds Metals Company’s story, like that of the infinitely better-known account of 
Henry J. Kaiser, provides valuable insights into the nature of US business-government relations 
and corporate political activity. Like Reynolds, Kaiser exploited the opportunities presented 
by WWII (as well as the opportunities presented by the Hoover administration and the New 
Deal) to expand his business empire from construction into shipbuilding, aircraft manufacture, 
and light metals production. Kaiser also built his empire by political networking at state and 
federal levels, famously declaring to journalists in July 1942:  
Every time I take anybody to a shipyard, they want to see the ways and they think that is 
the shipyard. Well, that isn’t the shipyard at all, and when you go to an aircraft plant, you 
want to see the garage they keep the planes in or build them in. That isn’t the aircraft 




As Stephen Adams has observed of Kaiser: “[he] could not have achieved his success in 
shipbuilding, steel, dam building, or aluminum without a healthy relationship with the executive 
branch”.27   
 
Similarly, Reynolds Metals would not have achieved this without considerable political backing 
and substantial federal finance.  Reynolds’ dividends from the federal government included an 
initial Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) loan to RMC of $15.3m to construct the 
Listerhill smelter in Alabama (named after Alabama senator Lister Hill in recognition of his 
central part in securing the construction of it), and a further $2.5m from the RFC’s subsidiary, 
the Defence Plant Corporation (DPC), for a new extrusion plant at Louisville, Kentucky. 
RMC’s loans from RFC and DPC conservatively totalled around 30% of that disbursed by the 
two public bodies. Some historians of aluminium have accepted Richard S Reynolds Snr’s 
version of events about his personal mortgaging of assets, alongside his far-sighted recognition 
of the threat posed by Nazi Germany and the need for aluminium as a lone voice in the 
wilderness, without recognising it as a well-rehearsed corporate narrative that portrayed the 
pater familias of the Company as a national saviour.28  
 
This was a familiar trope amongst businessmen, who had benefited from federal support, to 
perpetuate the self-made myth and portray themselves as hampered by and in conflict with 
government. Similarly, Adams has noted that “Kaiser got a lot of mileage from portraying 
himself in conflict with the bureaucracy”.29  Adams recounts the story of a US Chamber of 
Commerce dinner in 1934 at which successive businessmen demanded that government be 
kept out of business, while RFC chief Jesse Jones pencilled down how much each had been 
loaned by the Corporation. As Adams noted: “Businessmen are traditionally mute about 
opportunities government presents to them. At the same time, they loudly bemoan 
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restrictions on their activities, such as those accompanying the federal government’s rapid 
growth since the 1930s.”30  
 
RMC’s RFC and DPC loans were also offered at favourable rates.  Moreover, in a highly 
energy-intensive process like aluminum smelting, it is highly questionable whether a 
newcomer like Reynolds would have fared as well without the subsidised power rates from 
the TVA for their Listerhill Plant or from the BPA which provided power to their Washington 
State and Oregon smelters at Spokane, Tacoma, and Troutdale.  Despite Reynolds predictable 
complaints about power rates (partly as a negotiating position and in part to mythologise the 
vision of their founder, Richard S. Reynolds, Snr), TVA rates were half those paid by industrial 
customers in the US north-east. Equally, between 1940 and 1944 alone, RMC, and its 
subsidiaries and affiliates, secured $600m in government contracts. They also benefitted from 
tax breaks at state-levels, such as for their bauxite mining operations in Arkansas.31 As Mark 
Wilson has recently emphasised, it was such state support, alongside that of labor unions, 
(not just business cooperation) that played a crucial role in the prosecution of the war and 
the growth of these companies.32  
 
Reynolds and Kaiser bear comparison for several other reasons too.  Both used their 
locations, respectively as southern and western businesses, to build political connections and 
elicit support in a sympathetic political climate.  While Kaiser promoted himself as the “Builder 
of the American West”, so Richard S. Reynolds Snr (and Reynolds Metals) profited from 
promoting their role as an industrial leader in the “New South”.33 Reynolds’ family 
connections to the DNC in the South were invaluable in a period when the US legislature 
was dominated by senior Southern Democrats. As Richard Bensel observed, “Deep South 
constituencies were over-represented within the Democratic Party and even more 
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concentrated in the higher seniority of the separate committees.”34 This had a direct effect 
on the “deflection of federal spending toward the South”.35  
 
Reynolds Snr, his sons and key Company executives, made it their business to court those 
senior legislators, as well as acquiring allies within FDR’s administration. Equally both firms, 
while not active participants in the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s 
cases against Alcoa, used antitrust sentiments to elicit support from amongst key and 
prominent Democrats.  Besides being an observer of the cases against Alcoa, while working 
for his uncle, R. J. Reynolds, at Reynolds Tobacco, Richard S. Reynolds Snr had also witnessed 
the bitter antitrust cases over tobacco.36    
 
Reynolds (and Kaiser) provide an example of the transfer of organizational capabilities (in the 
form of bureaucratic expertise and networks) from the public to private sectors through the 
shrewd recruitment of politicians and officials from government departments and agencies; in 
Reynolds’ case cannily recruiting figures such as Keen Johnson, as well as others discussed 
here like Walter L. Rice, Marion Caskie, and Irving Lipkowitz.  
 
If anything, Reynolds political machinery was much more sophisticated than Kaiser’s.  
Reynolds avoided the controversy that later enveloped Kaiser resulting from the latter’s high-
profile association with prominent New Deal lawyer (and renowned lobbyist) Tommy “the 
Cork” Corcoran, by managing their political engagement in-house, although the scale of Henry 
Kaiser’s enterprises and the brief consideration of him as a presidential prospect for the DNC 




The Reynolds story contributes to wider debates amongst historians and political scientists 
about the character of business-government relations in the US between the “progressive 
era” and the Cold War, specifically the emergence of what Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt 
characterised as a “Corporate Commonwealth”, manifesting increasingly in the dynamics of 
US managerial capitalism identified by Alfred Chandler Jnr. Galambos and Pratt’s Rise of the 
Corporate Commonwealth published in 1988 advanced the idea that US business and 
government reached a comfortable accommodation between the early twentieth century 
and the late 1970s.38  The Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth provided a popular outing for 
ideas that Galambos had advanced in a seminal article in Business History Review in 1970, 
sparking off a debate amongst historians and political scientists.39 In this, and subsequent 
related work, he advanced the notion that an “organizational society” emerged in the US in 
the 20th century out of widespread managerial corporatism (in both business and 
government) that led to a more professionalised society and greater consensus between 
business and government.40  This was contiguous to a body of work from Ellis Hawley 
through to Michael Hogan charting the emergence of a “corporate liberalism”; a 
corporatism defined both on ideological and organisational grounds that sought, ‘a “middle 
way” between the laissez-faire of a bygone day and the paternalistic statism of an Orwellian 
nightmare’: 
In this system, partisan politics would give way to managerial expertise, public 
legislatures would yield some of their functions to private forums, and redistributive 
battles would dissolve in a material abundance in which all could share.41   
Whilst such arguments attracted considerable support – and to some degree coalesced with 
Chandler’s Parsonian-influenced work (although the doyen of business history never made 
such claims) – it was challenged on a number of grounds by historians and political scientists 




Amongst the most profound charges against it were those levelled by Michael McGerr who 
questioned whether “an organizational society” ever existed in the US.  More widespread 
was the charge, in the case of Galambos, that he was advancing a presentist and ahistorical 
argument.  The limitations of the historical period under analysis and changes overtime – 
which relied heavily on an interpretation of the progressive era – led some, notably Brian 
Balogh in 1991, to ask why the New Deal and World War II had not been more carefully 
considered.  A considerable literature has emerged around the nature of public-private 
engagement in the US during WWII, and over the question of the existence of a military-
industrial complex, since Balogh identified this lacuna.42   
 
Alan Brinkley and Brian Balogh’s cautioning against imposing “ironclad laws that governed 
organizational development” are born out in the Reynolds story, and in extant sectoral 
studies by business historians, which have helped to shed more light on this periodisation, 
and meaningful comparisons, as well as distinctions. 43 In particular, a key feature of this has 
focused on the importance of contests over monopolies and antitrust action. Most apposite, 
and intrinsically related to the Reynolds case, is George Smith’s deft discussions of the US 
government’s antitrust actions against Alcoa. Alcoa was subject to long antitrust actions 
brought against it by the Department of Justice (in 1911-12, 1924-1930, and 1937-45) and 
the Federal Trade Commission (during the 1920s), as well as being subject of enquiries of 
the Temporary National Economic Committee in the late 1930s.44   Paul Tiffany’s outlining 
of the long running battles and accommodations between US steel producers and 
government over antitrust (with actions taken both by the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission) under the presidencies of Taft, FDR and Truman also bears 
some comparison.  There are synergies too with Richard John’s study of US 
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telecommunications, and the emergence of the Bell System, and antitrust interventions by 
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the temporary bringing of telephone and 
telegraph services under public control. Such studies underline the importance of 
understanding the implications of longer running concerns over monopolies, and how 
battles and accommodations between business and government shaped the outlook and 
strategic decisions of those businesses.  As John has observed of the Bell System: “[It] was 
sustained in a corporate culture that had been nurtured by a distinctive configuration of 
governmental institutions and civic ideals.  This corporate culture was not free-floating: 
rather, it was the organizational response to the structuring of a progressive political 
economy.”45  
 
A further aspect of the Reynolds story’s contribution to this understanding of complexity 
around the “organizational society” is in multi-level governance by adding to further bodies 
of historiography on the regional aspects of the relationship of business and government, 
and on the personal politics of business leaders that affected these interactions with 
government.46 
 
Reynolds Metals meteoric rise within the global aluminum industry was even more marked 
given the high capital costs, geographically-extended and vulnerable supply chains, and 
associational barriers to entry.  As work by historians of global aluminum has underlined 
their ascendancy within the global industry was remarkable given the operation of an 
oligopoly and long running cartels throughout much of the first half of the 20th century.47 
Any other new entrants to this industry did so either as the subsidiaries of one of the first 
movers (or at the very least with a major share owned by one of them) or as a state-
sponsored corporation.  The growing strategic importance of aluminum meant that the 
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national industries were proximate to government (both as a major customer and to 
manage political risk) and subject to state intervention.48  The close ties between the first 
movers, and barriers to new entrants, was underlined pointedly by the hostility from the 
established order of the global industry when Reynolds (with the UK’s Tube Investments) 
gained control of BACo after a bitter takeover over 1958-1959.49    
 
To further clarify RMC’s organizational behaviours and strategy, the article explores these in 
conjunction with understanding of elite networks and the social and cultural capital (notably 
through the nurturing of trust).  This is also important in seeking to engage with social 
scientists working in the fields of corporate political activity, business-government relations, 
international business and strategy (including non-market varieties), which often lack all-
important historical contextualisation and case studies as increasingly noted by scholars in the 
field.50  So that whilst this is principally an historical article, explicit reference to this literature 
is important in encouraging inter-disciplinary dialogue.  In a recent notable example of a 
historically-informed organization study, that of the Hilton hotel group, Maclean et al note 
the importance of: “skilled social actors of rhetorically intense argumentation, elite political 
networking, coalition-building and cultivating officialdom enabled them to interact to good effect 
in selected localities”.51  In Hilton’s case, this involved linking the expansion of their chain to 
promoting US Cold War policy agendas. Reynolds Snr, the company officers he recruited and 
his successors, demonstrated all of the behaviours identified for the Hilton group.  Their 
nurturing of elite networks (politicians and officials) unlocked benefits for them and proved 
invaluable for achieving and maintaining competitive advantage.  French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu described social and cultural capital as: “the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”.52  Similarly Alejandro 
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Portes described social capital as accrued trust and arising benefits from membership of social 
networks.53 Richard S Reynolds Snr benefitted from these “aces in a game of cards,” as 
Bourdieu put it, “that define the chances of profit in a particular field.”54  The trust implicit in 
this social capital, as a number of scholars have noted, is critical to beneficial relationships 
with government.55 This article draws on understandings of trust as deployed by Sherylynne 
Haggerty in her study of transatlantic business networks in the 18th and 19th century, in 
particular the notions of “ascribed trust” (trust assumed from membership of certain 
networks and groups and assumed characteristics) and “process-based trust” (confidence built 
up over time by competency and goodwill).56   As the article demonstrates, Richard S. 
Reynolds’ background and his membership of key social networks afforded him “ascribed 
trust”.  Reynolds’ recruitment of the accrued knowledge and skills of former New Deal 
officials, and nurturing of politicians, both opened up new networks and won the Company 
“process-based trust”, as did their coalition building and rhetoric.   
 
Consequently, understanding of RMC’s success in political networking needs to start with 
Richard S. Reynolds Snr (his background, social milieu and relationships with key staff).  It 
was his legacy that would pay dividends in establishing the organisational capabilities 
necessary for the Company to succeed in in Washington and the state capitols of the South, 
seen in particular in his astute selection and nurturing of key staff.  These same staff would 
also mentor his own sons in public affairs.    However, it is important to note that the depth 
of trust for Reynolds (and the Company) was founded on an understanding that his family, 
location, and personal politics were based on common values with their political allies and 
that therefore Reynolds’ support of certain policy platforms was not simply transactional. 
Reynolds, much like other US businessmen of their generation, as Phillips-Fein and Zelizer 
observed, were: “Far from being concerned only with their individual firms and companies, 
  
17 
business people consistently sought to shape political life throughout the post-World War II 
years…”57   
 
Richard S. Reynolds Snr: Architect of Success 
Writing in 1945 a senior executive of one of RMC’s subsidiaries said of Richard S. Reynolds 
Snr that he had, “… a very certain undefinable characteristic awareness or subconscious 
intuition which leads him to act decisively before other people, including his own organisation, 
are aware of approaching circumstances.”58 This description of Richard S. Reynolds’ legendary 
foresight, in part, reflected a potent organizational narrative about the father of the Company. 
Nonetheless, it was also a well-placed observation on Reynolds’ acuity of vision.  Reynolds’ 
acumen was built on his considerable business experience, as well as the advantages afforded 
to him by his family reputation and political connections in the South.  
 
As the favourite nephew of R J Reynolds (“R.J.”), he acquired political acumen through the 
years spent working at Reynolds Tobacco between 1903 and 1912.  Through the Reynolds 
family [see figure 1] connections, he was initiated into social networks, which included leading 
Democratic Party figures in the South – such as Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of the Navy, 
Josephus Daniels (an old friend and business associate of R. J.’s) – as well as prominent 
businessmen of all political hues (notably James B. (“Buck”) Duke of the American Tobacco 
Company). As an indication of the Reynolds’ family’s place in the DNC machinery of the 
South, Richard S Reynolds Snr’s cousin, Dick Reynolds, was attributed with financing FDR’s 
second successful Presidential campaign. 59  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
It was also while working for R. J. that he witnessed first-hand the Department of Justice’s 
successful antitrust action against American Tobacco in 1911 (the same year that they won 
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an even more famous victory against Standard Oil) against mounting federal and state action 
against monopolies with the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 (in direct 
response to Rockefeller’s trust and leading to the formation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission) and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.  As Tony Freyer observed, 1911 was 
an auspicious year for federal antitrust actions and saw an intensified period of suits. The 
following year (1912) saw the passage of two further important milestones in US antitrust 
action, with the constitution of the Federal Trade Commission and the Clayton Antitrust 
Act.60  Besides absorbing the lessons of the antitrust actions, Richard S Reynolds Snr’s 
association with public enterprise enthusiast Josephus Daniels meant it was also possible that 
he was also conversant with the details of Daniels’ actions as Navy Secretary in setting up of 
a government owned and operated armour plate plant and transferring Marconi’s patents for 
the radio under American control.61   It is also likely that it was through Daniels that RSR Snr 
met RMC’s longest-running senatorial ally, Lister Hill, for whom the former Navy Secretary 
was a mentor.62   
 
Aside from his connections through R. J. to southern Democratic circles, the Reynolds name 
carried considerable cultural, social, and symbolic capital in the South, evoking economic 
development in the “New South” after Reconstruction. These lent him considerable “ascribed 
trust”, based on assumptions carried with that lineage, crucial to smoothing his way in these 
circles.63 Richard S Reynolds Snr was also able to link to the old South too; as a 17-year-old 
Virginia Military Institute cadet, his father, Abraham D. Reynolds, had enlisted in the army of 
the Confederacy and ended the war as a cavalry major.64  This location within an identifiable 
southern family was crucial to admitting him to social networks and unlocking social capital. 
It was exhibited both by the circles in which he moved and the cultural symbolism of practices 
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in this social milieu.  Richard Reynolds Snr understood the value of his power base in the 
South and how to deploy that to effect.   
 
Richard Reynolds Snr also learned valuable lessons about social networks, trust and loyalty 
(and conversely the risks when these were breeched) from bitter personal experiences with 
his own previous endeavours during WWI and with US Foils and ultimately Reynolds Metals 
also provided him with further.  He had co-founded US Foils with his father and Reynolds 
Tobacco but subsequently fell out with the latter over rights to the Company.65  As a result 
Reynolds Snr placed great stock in loyalty, vesting considerable power and responsibility in 
professional managers (in whom he entrusted both the success of the Company and the 
career development of his sons). This “bonding” of family was replicated in the “bridging” of 
social networks with trusted Company officials and political allies.66  Its success was visible 
from family succession within the Company, and the loyalty of its key officers. It was also 
evident in RMC’s enduring political relationships.  For RMC, the close familial relationship that 
RSR Snr nurtured with his sons (who all went on to senior roles in the Company), and other 
leading officers, was key to successful succession. RMC was characterised by close integration 
of family ownership and management into the 1970s.  The Reynolds family continued to 
maintain ties between ownership and management of the Company up until its merger with 
Alcoa in 2000; RSR Snr’s youngest son, David Reynolds, stepped down as President in 1995 
but continued as Chairman, whilst RSR Snr’s great-grandson, Richard Samuel Reynolds IV 
remained a group marketing manager for RMC and MD of the Reynolds Trust.67   
 
Richard S. Reynolds’ acuity was evident in his shrewd selection of the key Company personnel 
from the late 1930s onwards.  He recognised the social networks, and the knowledge and 
managerial skills, that these former officials brought with them. His memory of past battles 
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also informed the recruitment of these key Company officers, his coalition building, and use 
of political rhetoric.  His (and the family’s) loyalty to these key RMC officers was reciprocated; 
all would remain for the Company, with brief periods away (mostly for senior government 
service), for life.  
 
While RMC’s success was undoubtedly contingent on the context of more recent New Deal 
politics and the warfare state, Richard S Reynolds Snr’s social networks and observations of 
earlier antitrust battles cast a long shadow over his approach.  Similarly, as the next section 
indicates, Reynolds’ persuasiveness in political circles also relied on their personal credibility 
in coalition building. However, while this was to partially transactional, it also reflected the 
personal politics of the Reynolds family and key Company officers.  
 
Building organizational capabilities 
Richard S. Reynolds Snr’s perspicacious recruitment of key senior personnel from the late 
1930s onwards demonstrated an acuity to the capabilities that Reynolds Metals would need 
to succeed in the political climate in which they were operating.  These key figures brought 
with them years of experience and skills of operating in the political arena or government 
service, as well as valuable networks, which could open doors for the Company in Washington 
D.C., as well as in other parts of the South. As such they represented part of the wider 
transfer of valuable skills and knowledge between the public and private sectors as a legacy of 
increased role of the state in the economy.68  In this RMC (and other companies) was also 
aided by the dominance of the executive and legislature by southern Democrats throughout 
much of this period and the departure of highly able and brilliant public servants for the private 
sector; some of them frustrated at the lack of progress they had been able to make in 
government agencies to thwarting monopolies or aiding regional development.  The most 
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prominent example of this exodus being David E. Lilienthal, the lawyer who as a director, vice 
chairman and chairman of the TVA played a crucial role in advancing New Deal policies (and 
subsequently served as Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Authority), leaving 
government in 1950 having served under both FDR and Truman.69    
 
As Ken Lipartito noted of American business, “from its earliest years, big business has needed 
lawyers”.70 More specifically, as Peter Irons observed, the New Deal was a “lawyer’s deal”.71  
Ironically Richard S. Reynolds Snr’s uncle R. J., had counselled him to abandon his legal studies 
at the University of Virginia to join him in business.  However, R S Reynolds quickly recognised 
lawyers as an asset, not least having witnessed the anti-trust case against Buck Duke, and R 
J’s battles against Duke and American Tobacco.72  Richard S. Reynolds would also have been 
well-versed with the Department of Justice’s well-publicised cases against US Steel (1911-
1920) and, of course, against Alcoa (1911-12, 1924-1930, and 1937-45).73  
 
Amongst his shrewdest appointments was a former ATD lawyer, Walter Lyman Rice, who 
had served as Special Assistant to the Attorney General on antitrust action against Alcoa. A 
Minneapolis native, Walter Rice had extensive experience leading ATD antitrust cases, having 
joined straight out of Harvard Law School in 1928 (unusually for Reynolds, Rice was a lifelong 
Republican). Rice was marked out as a talented young lawyer with the Staff News of the 
Antitrust Division noting in 1936: “When a person wins praise on the pages of “The Nine Old 
Men” [the US Supreme Court] … it is time to sit up and take notice. But those who know 
him were not surprised when they read the flattering tribute given to Walter L. Rice…”74  In 
appealing to Rice, Reynolds Snr was speaking not just to a supremely talented ATD lawyer 
(with a close familiarity of the Alcoa antitrust case) but as someone who believed in breaking 
monopolies. Replying to antitrust campaigner, and Texas Congressman, Wright Patman in 
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1938, Rice declared: “I am sympathetic with the work you are doing and I am anxious to help 
you in any way that I can”.75   
 
Rice was subsequently joined by fellow ATD refugee, Irving Lipkowitz, who had worked with 
him on the Alcoa case. Lipkowitz was also a passionate New Deal liberal and antitrust 
advocate who also joined the Department of Justice after graduation from New York 
University in economics in 1934. Lipkowitz and Rice’s motivation for joining Reynolds may 
also have stemmed from the humiliation that the ATD suffered at the hands of Alcoa and 
their counsel.76 While Smith speculates that it was this experience that may have prompted 
Lipkowitz to join Reynolds in the early 1940s, another explanation may lie in the state of the 
ATD; despite renewed interest from the White House in anti-trust matters by 1937 and 1938 
the ATD, “simply had too much to do and too few resources”, although after the arrival of 
Thurman Arnold, it saw a renewed sense of purpose and change in antitrust philosophy.77 
Meanwhile FDR was encouraging cooperation between business and government.  An equally 
important factor was very probably RSR Snr’s persuasiveness, adroitness, and his own views 
on monopolies. 
 
A further shrewd appointment to the Company in 1940 was Alabamian Marion M. Caskie. 
Caskie had just stepped down as chairman of the powerful Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) and on FDR’s National Emergency Council (NEC). He was a former assistant federal 
coordinator of transportation (director of state docks in Mobile, Alabama).78  RSR Snr’s 
recruitment of Caskie exhibited considerable acuity at a number of levels.  Given Caskie’s 
position at the ICC (and as a former federal coordinator of transportation) – which controlled 
freight rates and regulated telecommunications as well as the railways – and the integrated 
supply chainrequired for aluminum production with plants spread over the US, this was a 
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shrewd move. Besides which, Caskie’s place on FDR’s NEC (re-formed in 1935 to oversee 
the delivery of the New Deal programmes) also provided Reynolds with valuable political 
connections in the White House.79  Caskie had also worked with Reynolds’ most enduring 
political ally on Capitol Hill, and fellow Alabamian, Senator Lister Hill, on the ICC, in 
attempting to secure more preferential freight rates for southern businesses, all part of 
attempts to further animate regional industrialization.80  
 
A further sagacious short-term engagement was that of Frenchman Louis Marlio, stranded in 
wartime Washington by Nazi occupation of his country. The former head of the international 
aluminium cartel, and the senior figure in the French aluminum industry, Marlio helped RMC 
in brokering aluminium contracts with the British Purchasing Commission.  Bertilorenzi argues 
that Marlio planned Reynolds post-war strategy.  This is quite possible from a commercial 
standpoint (given his extensive knowledge and connections in the global industry).  However, 
this overlooks the importance of the political environment to RMC’s ascendancy.81 
 
With the exception of brief periods of public service (which can only have served to renew 
the Company’s political influence as well as ensuring their enduring loyally), Caskie, Johnson, 
Lipkowitz and Rice would remain with Reynolds Metals for the remainder of their careers. 
Marion Caskie, as RMC vice-president, ran their Washington office from 1940 until retirement 
in 1956. Keen Johnson remained a VP with the Company (with the brief interlude of 1946-7 
as Truman’s Under Secretary of Labor) from 1944 until his retirement in 1961, providing 
invaluable political service. Similarly, with a brief interlude as US Ambassador to Australia 
from 1969-73, Walter Rice remained with the Company until his retirement, as did Irving 
Lipkowitz (who remained an authority on monopolies).  The attraction for them of joining 
Reynolds Metals was no accident but owed much to the possibilities of continuing the 
  
24 
commitment of antitrust ideals and regional development through the Company.  As with his 
political allies, Richard S. Reynolds Snr’s commitment to issues such as antitrust and southern 
industrialization and regional development bought their trust and loyalty in him. His 
confidence in them, as well as financial generosity, care and interest, assured him (and the 
family) of their long service and enduring loyalty as demonstrated by correspondence with 
him and his son, Richard S Reynolds Snr who succeeded his father to lead the Company.82 In 
a letter to RSR Snr and Jnr, while serving as Under Secretary of Labor from 1946-7, Johnson 
declared: “[I] shall always be eager to demonstrate my appreciation… I miss you and the zest 
of being a member of the great Company you have builded [sic].”83  While Marion Caskie 
declared in a letter to RSR Snr in 1949: “As you must know, there is nothing I wouldn’t do 
for you.  In fact, I would hate to be tempted as I might be inclined to even scuttle a ship if by 
doing so I could aid you personally in any way”; a delicious irony given Caskie’s role in helping 
them win defence contracts!84  
 
For Reynolds not only did this coterie of most trusted advisors bring specific valuable 
knowledge and helped tutor his sons to lead the business but further extended political 
influence.  These bonds of loyalty and trust ensured continued access to power brokers in 
Washington; so that when Marion Caskie retired he recommended as his replacement Edd 
Hyde who had previously worked on the staff of Alabama Democrat, and subsequently House 
Speaker, William Bankhead before working for Senator Sparkman.  Senator Lister Hill 
underlined the value of Hyde’s appointment in a letter to Richard S Reynolds Jnr (while 
informing him about the progress of a project before the Senate Appropriations Committee 
in which RMC had an interest):  
I want to tell you… that you are really to be congratulated on getting Edd…  [I] have 
known Edd for many years, including the years he served in the office of Speaker Bankhead, 
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with Congressman Carter Manasco and with Senator Sparkman.  He is extremely able and 
a wonderful fellow... We will certainly miss Edd on Capitol Hill, but our loss is your gain.85     
Like his predecessors, Hyde remained with the Company for the rest of his career, as did his 
wife.  
 
Alongside Richard S. Reynolds Snr’s own accrued experience and acumen, his investment in 
his brain’s trust of Caskie, Johnson, Lipkowitz and Rice would pay the Company enormous 
dividends for years in building political networks on and cultivating officialdom in the Capitol 
and the South.   
 
Capitol Allies: Building Networks and Coalitions 
These key Company officers’ knowledge and skills were essential to building the political and 
official networks that afforded them greater influence in Washington D.C. (and state capitols) 
and ultimately allowed to consolidate their position as a national (and international) aluminum 
producer.  If the Reynolds Metals Company could rely on “ascribed trust” based on family 
connections and regional location, then their employment of respected erstwhile public 
servants would build a “process-based trust” based on competency.86 That this was successful 
relied on their carefully nurtured relationships with powerful senior southern Democrats who 
dominated both Houses from the mid-1930s into the 1960s: Lyndon Johnson (Texas); Richard 
B. Russell (Georgia); John Sparkman (Alabama); Carl Vinson (Georgia); John L. McClellan 
(Arkansas); Estes Kefauver (Tennessee); J. William Fulbright (Arkansas); and above all the 
“Statesman from the South”, Senator Lister Hill.87 Similarly, Reynolds Metals cultivated strong 




This political support was reciprocated with endorsements and campaign finance from 
Reynolds.88  Reynolds rhetorical appeal to these politicians (on issues like antitrust, regional 
development, and national security) was also, in part, revealed by these southern Democrats’ 
platform and overlapping interests: “The success of these issue-orientated politicians was 
founded on a number of factors...  These include infrastructure politics, a common-man 
popular appeal, the relative prosperity of southern states and their newfound ability to match 
New Deal spending...”89 The firm’s contacts and links were cemented at events like the DNC’s 
Jefferson-Jackson dinners (an influential forum at which presidential hopes have been made 
and broken), of which RSR Snr and his sons were major backers.  At the 1952 dinner for Adlai 
Stevenson’s presidential campaign, for example, Lister Hill, RSR Jnr, Keen Johnson, and Marion 
Caskie, shared a table with Congressmen and Governors from Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, and Virginia.90   
 
Reynolds’ public espousal of the rhetoric of antitrust and regional development also won 
them the support of FDR’s powerful Secretary of the Interior (1933-1946), Harold L. Ickes. 
Ickes was an invaluable ally to Reynolds both in and out of office. Ickes oversaw the Public 
Works Administration and remained the most prominent and powerful New Dealer in 
FDR’s administration by 1940.  He welcomed RMC’s entry to US aluminum production, not 
least through his support of advantageous power contracts to the Company, as Ickes 
reminded RSR Jnr in 1950 of his greatest favour to the Company through: 
…  I would like to reminisce a bit with you about your company and the progress that 
you have made since you and I agreed upon a contract for power generated at Bonneville.  
Much water was gone over the dam – not necessarily Bonneville – since that day and I 
gather that your company has greatly prospered, which, of course, gives me a feeling of 
satisfaction in that it justified my judgment that your company could turn out aluminum if 
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given the opportunity which, in the particular instance referred to, meant hydroelectric 
power at a reasonable rate.91 
With such an energy-intensive process as aluminum production, the negotiation of favourable 
BPA contracts ensured the profitability of RMC’s Washington State and Oregon smelters. 
Ickes’ continued support for RMC arose because of their support for antitrust and regional 
development (and for the New Deal legacy).  After leaving office, they supported in each 
other’s reputations from public attacks. Ickes continued, through his column in the New York 
Post, to be influential, seeing himself as a defender of the New Deal’s legacy.92 Ickes was also 
trying to protect his personal reputation and legacy from attacks from columnist Drew 
Pearson.93  Similarly when Pearson slighted Reynolds in January 1951, Marion Caskie enlisted 
Ickes to rebut Pearson’s misrepresentation. Caskie testified to RSR Snr, and RMC’s, New 
Deal and patriotic credentials, while highlighting Ickes’ own important role.94 The timing of 
this could not have been more important to Reynolds from a reputational perspective while 
they were seeking to defend their domain in discussions over government contracts and 
resisting Alcan’s encroachment into US markets.  
 
Reynolds Metals’ competency, and specifically the knowledge and skills of Johnson, Caskie, 
and Rice, would be as crucial in building networks within officialdom, such as with the branches 
of the armed services supply departments. As their network and reputation for competence 
increased so more contacts came their way. A memo from RMC’s Washington office to the 
Company HQ in June 1944 explained their methodical approach to this, reassuring the board, 
“your Washington Staff is soliciting business, through project development, from the armed 
services and the services of supply”:  
In terms of the footworking: “Each small “unit” in the Navy, just as the Army, handles its 
business “through channels”.  As we follow our subject from unit to unit we find that have 
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to tell our story over again in each unit, that is, we must introduce the Company, prove 
its financial responsibility, demonstrate capacity and “know how”, explain the nature and 
location of plant equipment and generally build up confidence in our ability to do what we 
say we can.  If you inadvertently miss one unit in the sequence you will have delay and 
trouble in your project.95  
By June 1944, RMC’s official networks already included over 50 prominent officials. This 
methodical approach paid off when, in July 1944, a US Army contact provided them with 
contact details for all of the key figures in the Army, Navy Department, USMC, and USAAF.96 
RMC’s attention to detail was also visible in their head-hunting of well-placed military 
personnel close to retirement. At an Army Ordnance Dinner in Philadelphia in February 1945, 
attended both by RSR Jnr and Johnson (who was speaking, alongside the US Army’s Chief of 
Ordnance), Johnson scribbled next to the name of one of his fellow diners, Brigadier General 
D. N. Hauseman (responsible for equipping the army for readjustment), “in contract 
termination (Pentagon)”.97  
 
To further smooth discussions with the armed services, Reynolds ensured that they also 
enlisted the support of congressmen who covered the districts that might benefit from new 
plants.  In September 1944 after a meeting with Brig. Gen. Minton to discuss approval of the 
rubber development program (in which RMC had a stake) by the Combined Chiefs, RMC’s 
Washington Office reported:  
Congressman Charles R. Clason represents the Springfield, Massachusetts District in the 
House.  In view of the establishment of the Reynolds Casting Plant at Springfield, Governor 
Johnson thought it wise that Reynolds representatives formally pay their respects to Mr. 
Clason.  By appointment, therefore, the Governor and I called at the New House Office 
Building and enjoyed a most cordial reception and a most helpful visit.98 
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RMC’s attention to detail in cultivating networks recalls Henry J. Kaiser’s famous reproach to 
one of his managers complaining about naval supply departments in underlining the 
importance of careful attention to identifying the correct personnel and building relationships 
of trust: “You know there is no such things as the U.S. Navy! It’s just a bunch of guys down 
there in Washington.  Now which one is your problem?”99 
 
This mastery of procurement processes, and courting of defense and supply officials, and 
Washington committees, demonstrating competency, was also facilitated by trading goodwill 
with other industry contacts.  While Reynolds and Kaiser competed over market share and 
segment, their coalition-building in the late 1940s and early 1950s would be invaluable when 
it came to battles with Alcoa and attempts to block Alcan’s attempts to seize government 
contracts.  Similarly, Donald A. White of the Aluminum Association shared his knowledge of 
changing defense machinery with Reynolds (and Kaiser) when they sought to persuade 
government of the need to stockpiling materials.  White, noting that they had close contacts 
to Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Research and Development Board of the Organization 
for National Security, suggested: “if you have any difficulty in your bauxite plans urge you call 
in for help”.100 
 
Rhetorical Platforms and Deploying Assets 
Just how Reynolds conducted their dealings with senior Democratic politicians on Capitol 
Hill and the state capitols (as well as fellow industry figures), the rhetoric they used to enlist 
political support and forge coalitions, and how these political assets were deployed is set 
out in the ensuing discussions. RMC’s judicious targeting of key legislators on Capitol Hill, 
deployment of political rhetoric (on antitrust, regional development, and national security), 
alongside their southern credentials, were a feature of their modus operandi.  In this 
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espousal of such rhetoric, Reynolds were not unique amongst southern businesses in the 
immediate postwar period.101 
 
Their methodical approach was evident in their soliciting of senior southern legislators when 
seeking to purchase the Milledgeville Naval Ordnance Plant in Georgia from the Navy (and 
maintain the relationship with the Navy) in 1945. RSR Snr employed the rhetoric of both 
regional development and national security, and the Company’s southern credentials, in a 
letter seeking support from senior Georgia Senator Richard B. Russell: 
Our Company undertook this task because the Navy felt it was necessary to build a pool 
of skilled workers where they did not exist and the War effort would be benefited by 
this program.  As a corollary, it has always been the desire of our organisation and of our 
family over several generations to assist in every possibly [sic] way the industrialization 
of the South as it a cause very dear to our hearts.102 
Besides representing Georgia, Russell was also a powerful figure on the Senate Naval Affairs 
Committee.103 Over a thirty-year period, Russell’s influence on Capitol Hill was arguably 
unparalleled, not least on matters of defence spending.  He was responsible not only for 
securing contracts for his native Georgia but in distributing military spending around the states 
of southern allies. As Lyndon Johnson’s White House Press Secretary, George Reedy, put it: 
In terms of legislative achievement, it would be impossible to find a national leader of 
greater stature than Richard B. Russell of Georgia. With Russell's blessing, almost any 
measure could pass the Senate. Against his determined opposition, it was doomed... He 
was recognized on both sides of the aisle as the preeminent Senator.104 
Dean Rusk, Kennedy and Johnson’s Secretary of State, considered Russell “the second most 
powerful man in Washington” for “twenty years”.105 Seven months earlier, in March 1945, 
Keen Johnson had visited Congressman Carl Vinson, the powerful former chairman of the 
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Congressional Naval Affairs Committee, with a gift of a cane mounted with an aluminum 
battleship tailor-made by Reynolds. An appreciative Vinson introduced Johnson to the naval 
liaison officer at Milledgeville and assured him that the award they had been awaiting would 
be made.106 
 
Similarly, RMC used the rhetoric of regional development and national security to great effect 
in the state capitols of the South.  When the Arkansas state legislature, and new Governor 
Sid McGrath, threatened a severance tax on bauxite in early 1949, Keen Johnson mobilised 
their local political networks to delay the threat, citing regional development: “I repeatedly 
asserted that the future expansion of Reynolds Metals Company had been pointed toward 
Arkansas and that an increase in the bauxite tax at this time would preclude such expansion 
within Arkansas.”107 
 
However, the greatest marshalling of Reynolds political networks and rhetoric, as well as 
coalition building, were displayed in the campaign to prevent a reduction in tariffs on imported 
aluminum (while conversely supporting these changes for bauxite imports) and government 
stockpiling of Canadian aluminum. Senators Hill, Stuart Symington, and Fulbright were critical 
to these negotiations throughout the 1940s and 1950s.  Symington initially came into contact 
with Reynolds, in 1945, while chairman of the Surplus Property Board (SPB), which was 
responsible for selling off government war plants.  Symington’s experience, specifically his 
clashes with Alcoa, and its chairman, Arthur Vining Davis, while at the SPB made him a 
sympathetic audience. In Symington’s subsequent roles, he promoted the importance of 
aluminum to military aircraft production and helped broker the deal awarding government 
contracts to Kaiser and Reynolds, as well as to Alcoa.108   Senator William Fulbright had served 
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as an ATD attorney. By 1949, Senator Fulbright sat on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee 
and from 1955 chaired the Senate Committee on Banking and Finance.109 
   
Ranged against Reynolds (Kaiser, and the much smaller Fairmont Aluminum) was Alcoa, who 
saw the opportunity to eliminate the new competition.  In building its coalition, RMC 
proposed to defend its position by promoting the imperative of an expanded US aluminum 
industry to meet defence requirements and the need for an aluminum stockpile.  Writing to 
Richard S Reynolds Jnr in May 1947, Walter Rice proposed an unequivocal statement on these 
lines: “we should make it clear ‘that we are advocating, first and above all else, the necessity 
for national security and preservation of the aluminum industry, which means a Government 
stockpile of aluminum pig’”.110 RMC then circulated this proposal around political allies 
couching it in the necessary rhetoric of national security and antitrust.  They subsequently 
circulated this to all members of the Aluminum and Magnesium Industry Advisory Committee 
of the Army-Navy Munitions Board.  Alcoa meanwhile vehemently opposed Reynolds’ 
proposals – arguing instead for a bauxite stockpile – recognising that success of the former 
would strengthen the new entrants.    Following this, Reynolds consolidated support amongst 
other smaller aluminium producers.111 Rice had already secured the support of the Aluminum 
Association, deploying the same arguments around monopoly and national security.112 With 
Alcoa’s President, “Chief” Wilson, holding out, despite the majority of the committee 
supporting Reynolds’ position, RSR Jnr marshalled the support of the other producers behind 
a reply drafted by Rice and Lipkowitz underlining national defense priorities and highlighting 
in the process concerns also about Canadian imports.113 By directing attention on to Alcan, it 
also implicitly drew a link to Alcoa’s continued connection to its erstwhile Canadian 
subsidiary. This joint approach was further cemented at meeting between RMC and Kaiser 
Aluminum in July 1947, attended by RSR Jnr, Caskie, as well as Henry J Kaiser and Chad 
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Calhoun (manager of Kaiser’s Washington office and his main political aide), at which Kaiser 
agreed to support RMC’s strategy for blocking lower tariffs (below those fixed by the 1930 
Tariff Act) on imports of Canadian aluminum.114 Ultimately the Alcoa President was left 
isolated on the committee.115 As these negotiations reveal, RMC not only proved effective in 
protecting its own position but building consensus amongst and leading other aluminum 
producers to block Alcoa and Alcan.  
 
Reynolds deployed the same tactics in responding to the opportunities arising from the passing 
of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act (1946), which sought to reduce 
dependency on foreign nations for strategic raw materials. However this also posed significant 
new threats with closer integration of raw materials supply and war production during WWII, 
through bodies such as US-Canada Material Board and the Combined Production and 
Resources Board, continuing into the Cold War through the Defense Production 
Administration (DPA), the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and the Defense 
Materials Procurement Agency.116 This afforded the Aluminium Company of Canada (Alcan) 
even greater opportunities to compete in US markets.117 Alcan had enjoyed a “good war”, 
receiving tax breaks and substantial loans from the Canadian government, as well as benefitting 
from generous loan rates and contracts from the British government. Alcan also enjoyed the 
active support of the Canadian “Minister for everything”, Clarence Howe, in their lobbying of 
Ottawa, London, and Washington.118  
 
In the late 1940s and into the 1950s, RMC therefore campaigned against the awarding of 
government supply contracts to Alcan through the DPA and ECA, using their various political 
networks and deploying a rhetoric of economic nationalism.  This was illustrated by Keen 
Johnson’s appearance in September 1949 before the powerful Appropriations Committee to 
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discuss the Senate Foreign Air Appropriations Bill.  The committee was chaired by Tennessee 
Democrat Senator Kenneth McKellar, who was a fervent opponent of the New Deal (and 
therefore might look unfavourably on Reynolds). Keen Johnson met Sen. Lister Hill (who also 
sat on the Committee) in advance to agree on a series of leading questions which allowed 
Johnson to legitimately portray Reynolds as patriots, defenders of US jobs and regional 
economies, and a guardian against monopolies, before requesting that the “Appropriation Bill 
for the E.C.A be amended so as to require that the aluminum purchased by participating 
companies be purchased in the United States.”119   
 
Again, in 1951, RMC deploying the rhetoric of antitrust and economic nationalism, enlisted 
Patterson and Fulbright to block Alcan’s lobbying for Canadian imports to meet US defense 
requirements. Awarding defense procurement contracts to Alcan would be the equivalent 
Patterson stated of, “financing the Canadian Company’s expansion”.120 Fulbright used similar 
arguments against Canadian imports in the hearings of the Joint Defense Production 
Committee in May 1952. In March 1958 Richard S Reynolds Jr again sought to exploit 
Fulbright’s position on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by reiterating the Arkansas 
Senator’s previous arguments against US government purchases of Canadian aluminium 
imports by the DPC.121  Ironically by this time, Reynolds was already planning their own foreign 
interventions with the hostile takeover of “first mover” British Aluminium (BACo) in 1959, 
primarily to seize BACo’s Canadian subsidiary.  For this, and other interventions in Jamaica 
and the newly independent Ghana in the 1950s and 1960s, RMC relied on the political support 
of former Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, whose presidential campaigns they had 
contributed to in 1952 and 1956.122  
Reynolds Metals’ astute targeting and deployment of key political actors in Washington and 
the South and their use of political rhetoric to build coalitions was illustrated by the moves 
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they made to secure the Midgeville naval station, as well as the battles with Alcoa to protect 
their gains, and to resist Alcan’s greater penetration of US markets, through the late 1940s 
and into the 1950s.   
 
Conviction politics? 
Reynolds success in sustaining ties to the DNC, to senior figures on Capitol HillI, and in 
government hinged not only on their location, rhetoric and transactions, but also on a firm 
commitment to some of the political platforms on which these relied. The allegiances of vital 
Company officers Caskie and Johnson (as well as political allies like Lister Hill) to the Reynolds 
family were cemented by shared political allegiances and values.  As Caskie remarked, 
acknowledging divergences in the DNC, in a letter to RSR Jnr over the 1951 Jefferson-Jackson 
dinner: “The only new dealers or fair dealers will be Commissioner Aldridge, Wilson Wyatt, 
Arthur Grafton, Bob Jones, and myself, unless you can attend which will make it fifty-fifty”.123   
 
Throughout the 1960s, RMC retained close networks with the DNC, providing considerable 
support to JFK and Lyndon Johnson’s campaigns, and enjoyed especially close access to LBJ as 
President.124  This did not prevent Reynolds and Kaiser being reprimanded by Johnson and his 
staff in 1965 over their attempts to raise aluminium prices against the backdrop of the 
escalation of the Vietnam War.125 As late as 1968, Richard S Reynolds Jr signalled his 
commitment to New Deal style policies when writing to LBJ of his support for the Great 
Society.126  
 
What is striking, notwithstanding the transactional character of many of their discussions with 
their political allies, is that the Reynolds sons (like their father) continued to identify publicly 
with DNC New Dealers.  This was, in contrast, to the “conservative businessmen and their 
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allies” in the South of the 1950s and 1960s, pursuing a “conservative segregationist” agenda.127 
Many of Reynolds senate allies supported segregation (in most cases enthusiastically, in others 
as a political expedient), while swimming against the tide in their commitment to New Deal 
institutions.  However, RSR Jnr donated funds to the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund in the early 1950s.128 Both of his sons were to enter Virginia Democratic politics, most 
famously J. Sargeant “Sarge” Reynolds who became Lt. Governor of the Commonwealth in 
1970 aged 34 after a landslide victory only to die 6 months later. “Sarge” Reynolds counted 
substantial support from the Virginia Black Caucus because of his progressive views on race.  
Alongside his career in Reynolds businesses, Richard S. Reynolds Jnr’s other son Richard S. 
(Major) Reynolds III was also elected to the Commonwealth’s legislature and stood in the 
Democratic Primary for Lt Governor in 1977.129    Without evidence of shared values, 
alongside these networks, it is questionable whether Reynolds would have cemented such 
strong political relationships. 
 
Conclusion 
In his 1956 address to the Newcomen Society, after the death of his father, RSR Jnr declared: 
“… our company is the product of my father’s vision, his willingness to fight for what he knew 
was right, and… his peculiar ability to make opportunity out of crisis”.130 RSR Snr and his sons 
indubitably knew good press when they saw it.  Nevertheless, RSR Jnr’s eulogising was not far 
from the truth in emphasizing his father’s acuity of vision. Richard S Reynolds Snr had identified 
the opportunity afforded by the context of wartime and revived state intervention in the 
1930s (under Hoover and FDR)  to break into aluminium production within a short space of 




There was no little irony in his grandson, Major Reynolds, declaring during the Democratic 
Primary for the Lt Governorship of Virginia in 1977 that the benefit of 80%-90% of his 
campaign being funded by his family, “is the independence it gives a candidate. You're not 
beholden to special interests”.131 Reynolds Metals’ success in breaking into US aluminium 
production was built on their astute recruitment of former politicians and officials, their 
methodical construction of networks in Washington D.C., and deployment of these both to 
build the business and manage threats to the infant business.  As brokers Tucker, Anthony & 
Co. recognised in July 1946: “The Reynolds management is resourceful and aggressive and in 
our view the industry is entering upon a period of favourable years…”132  Their building of 
coalitions with legislators (Hill, Russell, Vinson, Fulbright, Symington) and administrators 
(Ickes) was further cemented by their effective use of political rhetoric around antitrust, 
regional development, and national security.  Reynolds were aided in their recruitment of key 
staff (Johnson, Rice, Caskie, Lipkowitz, and Hyde) and the rhetoric they deployed by the legacy 
of the New Deal and the context of wartime.   
 
The lessons that RSR Snr learned at Reynolds Tobacco, and with U.S. Foils and RMC, and 
the social networks that he developed were key to his success. Reynolds understood the 
importance of extending the principles of family business, to bridge social networks and 
build loyalty through shared values, to developing a strong proactive relational political 
strategy.  Throughout this process, RMC was well served by their Southern power base and 
pedigree. RSR Snr and his sons had considerable accrued social and cultural capital, which 
helped to build their political networks. Reynolds Snr, and the Company officers, that he 
recruited and that tutored his sons in the political arts.  Reynolds Snr’s acumen was revealed 
by his identification of the formidably impressive managers, recruited from government that 
oversaw negotiations in Washington and the state capitols: Keen Johnson; Marion Caskie; 
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Walter Rice; and Irving Lipkowitz. The recruitment of this group was pivotal to the building 
of Reynolds’ formidable Washington machinery. These opportunities were contingent on 
historical context and a supportive state, presented by the long politics of the New Deal 
and wartime. As such, Reynolds’ story provides an illustration of the ‘organizational society’ 
and the transference of knowledge and skills from New Deal administration to the private 
sector.  
 
It demonstrates the importance of cultivating these political and official networks, nurturing 
of coalitions, and deployment of rhetoric to cementing their success. As Mary Rose has 
observed contacts, goodwill, loyalty and trust play an integral role in family firm survival.133  
Certainly, they illustrate the value that can extend from family ties into wider social 
networks underpinning a proactive political strategy.  However, the strength of these, in 
RMC’s case, was firmly rooted in the ability to demonstrate shared alliances and values.  
This was cemented over time by recruiting officials and political allies who shared those 
commitments and nurturing their loyalty and trust.   
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